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Abstract
This paper investigates the price war in the UK quality newspaper
industry in the 1990s. We build a model of the newspaper market which
encompasses demand for di¤erentiated products on both, the readers and
advertisers side of the market, and prot maximization by four compet-
ing oligopolistic editors who recognize the existence of an indirect network
e¤ect of circulation on advertising demand. Editors choose rst the polit-
ical position, then simultaneously cover prices and advertising tari¤s. We
contribute to the literature on two-sided markets by endogenizing the po-
litical di¤erentiation of newspapers in a model with more than two rms.
We simulate changes to market structure in order to explore which of the
candidate explanations is most likely to lie behind the observed price war.
1 Introduction
In this paper we investigate the price warin the UK weekly quality broadsheet
newspaper industry in the 1990s. The public discussion of this period has por-
trayed it as being a case of presumed predatory pricing. While present lack of
data does not yet allow us to fully investigate this claim, we focus our argument
on that fact that the newspaper industry is a prima facie case for an analysis of
a two-sided market that should be conducted in terms of the Hotelling (1929)
model of horizontal product di¤erentiation.
A two-sided market (see Parker & Van Alstyne (2005), Armstrong (2006),
Rochet and Tirole (2006)) involves two groups of agents who interact via "plat-
forms", where one groups benet from joining a platform depends on the size
1
of the other group that joins the platform. In two-sided markets there are there-
fore critical network e¤ects due to externalities not only from the group on the
same side but also from that on the other side.
The media market is a typical two-sided market (see Anderson and Gab-
szewicz (2008)), as a media rm typically sells content to consumers read-
ers/viewers/listeners and advertising space to advertisers. The rm knows that
the number (and characteristics) of consumers inuence the demand for adver-
tising space while, vice versa, depending on the media product, the number (or
concentration) of advertising spaces may inuence the demand from consumers.
In the case of newspapers, clearly the advertisers are concerned with the
reach of a newspaper and hence a newspaper with a higher market share will
face a higher demand for its advertising slots for any given advertising tari¤.
Whether instead readers like or dislike advertising is a debated issue.
Previous theoretical work has modelled newspaper competition as taking
place on the political line. Among them Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2001,
2002), who, as we do, endogenise the location choice in a rst stage, while in
most models location is only exogenous. Our model features four oligopolistic
competitors rather than two that have been investigated frequently.
The employment of the Hotelling model implies that there is an important
non-price dimension which a rm may use as an instrument to adversely a¤ect
a competitor. This mechanism is important to this industry independently of
whether the pricing strategy should be termed predatory or not.
Arguing in favour of a more economics and e¤ects-basedrather than form-
based approach to EU Competition Law, Gual, et. al. (2005) argue that
predation might in fact employ a wide set of strategic instruments and in par-
ticular may take place also through product di¤erentiation. The issue of being
able to harm a competitor in the newspaper industry by the political location
of the newspaper was rst suggested in Behringer (2007). His analysis uses
industry data on newspaper circulation and prices and, by using the Hotelling
model, is able to depict the implied changes on the political line. However his
analysis is limited to the readers market and the model is therefore single-sided.
The current paper extends it to the advertising market and therefore proposes
a two-sided model.
Due to the complexity of the theoretical modelling and the substantial data
requirements, structural econometric work on the media as two-sided markets
is still quite scarce. Rysman (2004) analyses the market for yellow pages in the
U.S. and shows that network e¤ects between advertisers and readers are indeed
present. He also considers whether the market benets from monopoly (which
takes advantage of network e¤ects) or oligopoly (which reduces market power)
and nds that a more competitive market is preferable. While the markets
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analysed are di¤erent, we (and Chandra (2008)) use the specication for the
advertising demand he proposed.
Kaiser and Wright (2006) estimate an adapted version of Armstrongs (2006)
model of competition in a two-sided market where magazines compete in Hotelling
duopolies and nd that, due to the presence of indirect network e¤ects, in Ger-
many the readers side of the market is subsidized by the advertisers. While
they allow for an e¤ect of advertising on circulation, location is exogenous and
there are only two competing rms.
Argentesi & Filistrucchi (2007) test for market power in the national daily
newspaper market in Italy, concluding that the four main national daily news-
papers have colluding on the cover price but not on the advertising one. We
extend their framework by endogenising the choice of political position while
also substituting nested logit demand with Hotelling demand.
Fan (2008) analyses the market for daily newspapers in the U.S. and sim-
ulates some proposed mergers among them. Her model is the only one which
allows for endogenous product characteristics. Again, while she uses a mixed
logit specication for the readersside of the market, we use a Hotelling one.
Furthermore, due to the direct e¤ect of location changes on neighbours market
shares and prots only, the role of the political position as a characteristic is
more complex than those of the characteristics modelled in her paper.
Instead of estimating the parameters of the theoretical model some papers
test the validity of conclusions obtained in a theoretical model econometrically.
Among these are Chandra (2009) and Collard-Wexler (2009) who analyse the
merger wave among Canadian newspaper using a Hotelling framework for both
sides of the market. Location choices are however exogenous and their analysis
is restricted to duopoly.
Our model therefore encompasses demand for di¤erentiated products on
both sides of the market and prot maximization by four competing oligopolis-
tic newspapers who recognize the existence of indirect network e¤ects between
the two sides of the market. They rst choose the political position and then
cover prices and advertising tari¤s simultaneously. The importance of changes
in the political line during the 90s for daily newspapers in the UK has been
emphasized by political scholars, e.g. Curtice (1997). We show that, under cer-
tain assumptions on the advertising demand, this two-sided market setup can
be reduced to a setting that can be investigated using an extended Hotelling
setup as in Götz (2005).1
1We are very gratefuly to Georg Götz for making his Mathematica code available to us.
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2 The UK newspaper industry in the 1990s
The labour force of the UK newspaper industry when still located at Fleet Street
in London was heavily unionized when in February 1981 News International
Newspaper Ltd. (NIN) owned by Rupert Murdoch purchased The Times news-
paper. During the 1980s, NIN therefore clandestinely equipped a new printing
facility for its UK newspapers in the London district of Wapping where news-
papers could be composed electronically rather than using the hot-metal and
labour-intensive linotype method.
At the time NIN owned The Times, the Sunday Times, the Sun and the News
of the World. When the print unions announced a strike, NIN activated this new
plant with the assistance of the Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunications, and
Plumbing Union (EETPU). This led to the "Wapping dispute" from January
1986 to February 1987 which changed the history of UK industrial relations
and of the newspaper industry in the UK. By 1988 nearly all the national
newspapers had abandoned Fleet Street for the Docklands and started to change
their printing practices to those employed by NIN.
Despite these events during the early 1990s the UK quality broadsheet news-
paper industry composed of the The Times, The Independent, The Guardian,
and the Daily Telegraph, had seen a relatively homogenous and stable pricing
pattern for weekly editions. Then, on the 6. September 1993 NIN decided to cut
the price for The Times from 45p to 30p, thereby undercutting the Guardian at
45p, The Independent at 45p and The Daily Telegraph at 48p. Public perception
had it that a price warin the quality newspaper industry had begun.
The Independent, quoting a media analyst conjectured that the price cut
was directed against its market share. When the Independent was launched in
1986, it took more readers from The Times than the Guardian or the Telegraph
(...) It has been the Independent holding back The Times ever since.2 Imme-
diately after the announcement, Robin Cook, then the Labour partys trade and
industry spokesman wrote to the O¢ ce of Fair Trading demanding an inquiry
into possible unfair competition. The Independent estimated that at the current
level of circulation of around 350,000 (August 1993) this price cut came at a
cost to The Times of about £ 50,000 per day.
2 Independent, 3. September, 1993, Media analysts say Times cut is commercial mad-
ness.
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Bryan Carsberg, director general of the O¢ ce of Fair Trading (OFT) ob-
served with interestthe alleged newspaper price warthat Rupert Murdoch
ignited. His o¢ ces denition of predatory pricing - the deliberate acceptance
of losses in the short term with the intention of eliminating competition so that
enhanced prots may be achieved in the long term - looks prima facie as if it may
indeed apply to the battle between the loss-making Times and the struggling
Independent.
Because of its substantial nancial di¢ culties, the Independent decided to
raise its price from 45p to 50p on the 12. October 1993 but then came under
even more pressure as the Telegraph under Conrad Black also decided to drop
its price from 48p to 30p on 1. August 1994.
On 24. June 1994 The Times decreased is price again from 30p to 20p.
By this time the issue has received strong political attention. Tam Dalyell,
Labour MP said it was an issue of the quality of democracy, and Tony Wright,
Labour MP said that the use of monopoly power to drive out competitors was
o¤ensiveto the public interest. A plurality of opinion was vital. Robin Cook
demanded that the OFT should come up with a decision in favour of predatory
behaviour since Bryan Carsberg had been talking about a thin dividing line
between normal and aggressive competition and with the new price cut this line
now surely had been crossed.
The Independent quotes Dalyells estimates that of the 20p The Times re-
ceived for each copy, 17.5p went to wholesalers and retailers and the cost of
printing a copy was 15p. This is a £ 30m a year subsidy. The Independent
reacted on the 1. August 1994 and reduced its price from 50p to 30p perma-
nently in order to stop the decline of its circulation that decreased by 20% since
The Times had rst reduced its price. Its nancial situation was known to be se-
vere. In the beginning of 1994 a substantial renancing had to take place which
prevented the paper from being taken over from Carlo de Benedetti, another
newspaper tycoon.
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On 21. October 1994, the OFT issued a decision in the case. Bryan Carsberg
said that his inquiry into the price cuts had not established a case for formal
action under the competition legislation. Subsequently there was a period of
increase in cover prices as the costs of news printing were rising for all rms. The
Times decided to increase its prices from 20p to 25p on the 3. July 1995 and at
the same date The Telegraph also increased from 30p to 35p. The Independent
followed on the 17. July and increased its price to 35p. Another wave of price
increases was initiated by The Times and The Telegraph on the 20.November
1995 who raised their prices to 30p and 40p respectively. The Independent
leapfrogged on the 22. January 1996 ending a period of rapid price uctuations
that lasted for 29 months.
The exact consequences of the alleged price war period are a matter of vig-
orous public disagreement. In fact no consensus emerged even as to who the
alleged predator The Times was preying against. The data shows the follow-
ing picture between August 1993 and January 1996: The Times has increased
circulation market share from about 17% to 28%. The Independent has moved
from 16% to 12% and the Daily Telegraph has moved from 49% to 43%. The
market share of the Guardian has decreased a little. Looking at these gures
one has to keep in mind that the prices of The Times are still 15p, that of the
Independent and the Telegraph 5p lower than in 1993.
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3 The Model
We set out to shed some light on issues of this price war using the Hotelling
model. The model is conceptually very simple but ts the localized competition
of the newspaper market well. The product di¤erentiation is assumed to be
one dimensional and rms can charge di¤erent prices inuencing the position of
marginal consumers drawn from some distribution function over the character-
istic space which we simplify to be the real line. The standard transport cost
parameterized by t is thus a shared disutility that occurs if a reader does not
consume the newspaper that exactly corresponds to her most preferred variety.
Mathematically the model can become very complex once locations of the
rms on the characteristic space are no longer xed (e.g. see Anderson, (1992),
p.284). Also almost all theoretical models using assume that there are only two
rms and if the n-rm case is analyzed symmetry assumptions about substi-
tution patterns (e.g. logit model) or the use of a circular characteristic space
(e.g. Salop model) erase many of the realistic properties of the simple model
for the newspaper industry. Following the possible non-existence of Nash price
equilibria for given and close locations noted by dAspremont, Gabszewicz, &
Thisse (1979) we assume that transport costsare quadratic.
A full characterization of the theoretical setup with more than two rms,
variable location, variable price, and endpoints in a two-sided market implies
a non-trivial analytical challenge. In order to meet this challenge we have to
put some structure on the order of the players moves and on the shape of the
demand function on the demand for advertising.
We assume that rms play a non-cooperative two-stage game in which in the
rst stage they simultaneously chose their optimal locations on the political line
and in the second stage they simultaneously chose both prices and advertising
rates. The solution concept is subgame-perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE).
We assume four rms (newspapers), the Guardian (G); the Independent (I);
The Times (T ); and the Daily Telegraph (DT ) that are di¤erentiated on the
political unit-line from left to right according to common consensus. Demand is
fully inelastic and consumers have utility u: :p: from consuming the good and
a quadratic cost proportional to the distance between their (political) location
and that of the rm l:. The position of a marginal consumer (x::) between two
rms i and i+ 1 can be determined by the indi¤erence condition
ui   ipi   t(xi;i+1   li)2 = ui+1   i+1pi+1   t(xi;i+1   li+1)2 (1)
of the consumer located at xi;i+1. Hence this marginal consumer, who is indif-
ferent of buying good i and i+ 1 is located at
xi;i+1 = xi;i+1 =
1
2
i+1pi+1 + tl
2
i+1   ipi   tl2i
t (li+1   li) (2)
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and symmetrically the marginal consumer on his left is at
xi 1;i =
1
2
ipi + tl
2
i   pi 1i 1   tl2i 1
t (li   li 1) (3)
Thus the market share of some interior newspaper i = I; T given that con-
sumers are distributed uniformly is
msi = xi;i+1   xi 1;i = (4)
1
2t
(i+1
pi+1
li+1   li   ipi
li+1   li 1
(li+1   li) (li   li 1) + i 1
pi 1
li   li 1 + t (li+1   li 1))
If we look at non-interior rms, for the LHS rm G setting xi 1;i = 0 we
have
msG=i = xi;i+1   xi 1;i = xi;i+1 =
1
2
i+1pi+1 + tl
2
i+1   ipi   tl2i
t (li+1   li) =
lG + lI
2
+
IpI   GpG
2t (lI   lG) (5)
For the RHS rm DT we have xi;i+1 = 1 and
msDT=i = xi;i+1   xi 1;i = 1  xi 1;i =
1  1
2
ipi + tl
2
i   pi 1i 1   tl2i 1
t (li   li 1) = 1 

lT + lDT
2
+
DT pDT   T pT
2t (lDT   lT )

(6)
If we further assume i =  8i the system reduces to a demand for an
interior rm i = I; T of
msi =
li+1   li 1
2
+

t
pi+1   pi
2 (li+1   li)  

t
pi   pi 1
2 (li   li 1) (7)
and that of the rm G on the LHS as
msG =
lG + lI
2
+

t
pI   pG
2 (lT   lG) (8)
and that for DT on the RHS as
msDT = 1 

lT + lDT
2
+

t
pDT   pT
2 (lDT   lT )

(9)
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The resulting elasticity matrix given the 4 newspapers is
"G;G "G;I "G;T "G;DT
"I;G "I;I "I;T "I;DT
"T;G "T;I "T;T "T;DT
"DT;G "DT;I "DT;T "DT;DT
 =

2t

  1(lI lG)
pG
msG
1
(lI lG)
pI
msG
0 0
1
(lI lG)
pG
msI
  lT lG(lT lI)(lI lG)
pI
msI
1
(lT lI)
pT
msI
0
0 1(lT lI)
pI
msT
  lDT lI(lDT lT )(lT lI)
pT
msT
1
(lDT lT )
pDT
msT
0 0 1(lDT lT )
pT
msDT
  1(lDT lT )
pDT
msDT

Note that these elasticities depend on locations, i.e. the newspapers optimal
choices in the rst stage of the game.
Locations l; newspaper prices pN ; and advertising rates pA are determined
in a non-cooperative supply side game. Thus we determine equilibrium prices
p(l) and r given the location vector in stage II and then the SPNE location
vector l = (lG; l

I ; l

T ; l

DT )
0 in stage I.
Prots with di¤erentiated products in stage II are
IIx (p
A
x ; p
N
x ) = (p
N
x (l) cNx )msNx (pN (l))+(pAx  cAx )msAx (pA;msN (pN (l))) (10)
As the newspaper industry is a prima facie case of a two-sided market there is a
second side to the rms overall prot that results from sales of advertising slots
to advertisers. Advertising demand for a particular newspaper will increase in
the newspapers reach and hence its reader market share.
Lemma 1 The Nash equilibrium in prices necessarily satises
pNx (l)  cNx
pNx (l)
=   1
"xx
0@1 + pAx   cAx
pNx (l)
0@ @msAx
@msNx
"xx +
1
msNx
X
j 6=x
@msAx
@msNj
"jxms
N
j
1A1A
(11)
where "xx =
@msNx
@pNx (l)
pNx (l)
msNx (p
N (l))
and "jx =
@msNj
@pNx (l)
pNx (l)
msNj (p
N (l))
are respectively own-
and cross-price elasticities.
Proof: Take derivative.
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Given the Hotelling demand and elasticity structure the markup
pNx (l)  cNx
pNx (l)
=   1
"xx
0@1 + pAx   cAx
pNx (l)
0@ @msAx
@msNx
"xx +
1
msNx
X
j 6=x
@msAx
@msNj
"jxms
N
j
1A1A
(12)
for example for the Independent, using "II ; "GI ; and "TI as given above this
simplies to
pNI (l)  cNI =
2msNI (lT   lI) (lI   lG) t
(lT   lG) 0@1 + pAI   cAI
msI
0@ @msAI@msNI   (lT lG)t(lT lI)(lI lG)+
@msAI
@msNG


2t(lI lG)

+
@msAI
@msNT


2t(lT lI)
 1A1A (13)
3.1 Solving stage II : Newspaper prices
Solving for the equilibrium prices of the second stage analytically is possible.
Given the market shares from (4) and some simplications we nd that
equilibrium prices for the Independent are
pNI (l) =
1
2
cI+
(lT   lI) (lI   lG) t
(lT   lG)

lT   lG
2
+
pT (l)
2t (lT   lI) +
pG(l)
2t (lI   lG)

 1
2
AI
(14)
where AI  (pAI   cAI ) @ms
A
I
@msNI
: By symmetry for the Times we have
pNT (l) =
1
2
cT+
(lDT   lT ) (lT   lI) t
(lDT   lI)

lDT   lI
2
+
pDT (l)
2t (lDT   lT ) +
pI(l)
2t (lT   lI)

 1
2
AT
(15)
For the Guardian, using "GG (12) simplies to
pNG (l)  cNG = 2
t

(lI   lG)msG  Ax =
2
t

(lI   lG)

lG + lI
2
+
pI(l)  pG(l)
2t (lI   lG)

 AG (16)
which we can solve for prices as
pG(l) =
1
2
cG +
1
2
(lI   lG) (lG + lI) t

+
1
2
pI(l)  1
2
AG (17)
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For the Daily Telegraph, using "DT;DT we have
pNDT (l)  cNDT = 2
t

(lDT   lT )msDT  ADT =
2
t

(lDT   lT )

1 

lT + lDT
2
+
(pDT (l)  pT (l))
2t (lDT   lT )

 ADT(18)
which can be solved as
pDT (l) =
1
2
cDT + lDT (1  1
2
lDT )
t

  lT (1  1
2
lT )
t

+
1
2
pT (l)  1
2
ADT (19)
We thus have as system of 4 equations in 4 unknowns as
pG =
1
2
cG +
1
2
t

(lI   lG) (lG + lI) + 1
2
pI   1
2
AG (20)
pI =
1
2
cI +
(lT   lI) (lI   lG) t
(lT   lG)

lT   lG
2
+
pT
2t (lT   lI) +
pG
2t (lI   lG)

  1
2
AI
(21)
pT =
1
2
cT+
(lDT   lT ) (lT   lI) t
(lDT   lI)

lDT   lI
2
+
pDT
2t (lDT   lT ) +
pI
2t (lT   lI)

 1
2
AT
(22a)
pDT =
1
2
cDT + lDT (1  1
2
lDT )
t

  lT (1  1
2
lT )
t

+
1
2
pT   1
2
ADT (23)
In matrix form we can write this as:
1
2

 cG   t (lI   lG) (lG + lI) +AG cI   t (lT   lI) (lI   lG) +AI cT   t (lDT   lT ) (lT   lI) +AT cDT   2lDT (1  12 lDT ) t + 2lT (1  12 lT ) t +ADT
 =
 1 12 0 0
lT lI
2(lT lG)  1 lI lG2(lT lG) 0
0 lDT lT2(lDT lI)  1 lT lI2(lDT lI)
0 0 12  1
x

pG
pI
pT
pDT

which can be solved analytically for the equilibrium price vector pN(l)0 =
(pG(l); p

I(l); p

T (l); p

DT (l))
0 by inverting the system.
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3.2 Solving Stage II: Advertising rates
Prot as given in (10) is
IIx (p
A
x ; p
N
x ) = (p
N
x (l) cNx )msNx (pN (l))+(pAx  cAx )msAx (pA;msN (pN (l))) (24)
and also depends on the other side of the market, i.e. on advertising revenue.
Hence rmalso simultaneously chose optimal advertising rates pAx .
As in the model of Rysman (2004), advertising utility will depend positively
on the newspapers share of the readers market. Whence a representative adver-
tiser with newspaper x is assumed to maximize
max
fmsAx g
((msNx )
(msAx )
   pAxmsAx ) (25)
with elasticities 0 < ;  < 1 which leads to a demand for advertising as
msAx =

1

pAx
(msNx )

 1
 1
(26)
or in logarithmic form as
lnmsAx =
1
1  

ln() + ln()  ln(pAx ) +  lnmsNx

(27)
If  = and  = 1   this leads to demand for advertising as
msAx =

(1  ) 
pAx
 1

msNx (28)
or
lnmsAx =
1


ln(1  ) + ln()  ln(pAx )

+ lnmsNx (29)
for estimation purposes.
Consequently:
Lemma 2 The Nash equilibrium in advertising rates necessarily satises
pAx =
cAx
1   (30)
Proof: Take derivative of the advertising prot function.
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3.3 Solving stage I
Given our results from stage II of the game we can rst show the following:
Proposition 3 Given the structure of the advertising side, the problem at the
rst stage can be transformed into a Hotelling problem with prots depending
only on location as 0(pAx ; p
N
x ) = (p

x(l)  c0x)msx(p(l)).
Proof:
Prots for newspaper x with a price vector that depends on locations of the
papers pN (l), and an advertising rate vector pA are
x(p
A
x ; p
N
x (l)) = (p
N
x (l)  cNx )msNx (pN (l)) + (pAx   cAx )msAx (pA;msN (pN (l)))
(31)
With Nash in prices we nd the foc w.r.t. pNx (l) as
@x(p
A
x ;p
N
x (l))
@pNx (l)
= msNx (p
N (l)) + (pNx (l)  cNx )
@msNx (p
N (l))
@pNx (l)
+ (32)
(pAx   cAx )[rmsAx (msN )]0rmsN (pNx (l)) = 0
Given the advertising demand structure, all market share gradient vectors are
single valued. Thus the foc reduces to
msNx (p
N (l))+(pNx (l) cNx )
@msNx (p
N (l))
@pNx (l)
+(pAx cAx )
@msAx
@msNx (p
N (l))
@msNx (p
N (l))
@pNx (l)
= 0
(33)
or
msNx (p
N (l)) +
0BBB@pNx (l)  cNx + (pAx   cAx ) @msAx@msNx (pN (l))| {z }
Ax
1CCCA @msNx (pN (l))@pNx (l) = 0
(34)
or
pNx (l)  cNx =  
1
"xx
pN (l) Ax (35)
where "xx is the own price elasticity.
Given the advertising structure we can then nd an alternative prot function
as
0x(p
A
x ; p
N
x (l)) = p
N
x (l)  cNx + (pAx   cAx )
@msAx
@msNx (p
N (l))| {z }
Ax
)msNx (p
N (l)) (36)
13
Given the equilibrium advertising demands (28) and rates (30) the alternative
prot function reduces to
0x(p
A
x ; p
N
x (l)) = p
N
x (l)  cNx + (

1  c
A
x )

(1  )2 
cAx
 1

| {z }
Ax| {z }
c0x
)msNx (p
N(l))
(37)
i.e. a standard Hotelling prot of the form 0 = (px  c0x)msx(p(l)): As Ax and
thus c0x are exogenous, we have
@0x(p
A
x ; p
N
x (l))
@pNx (l)
= msx(p(l)) + (px   c0x)
@msx(p(l))
@pNx (l)
=
@x(p
A
x ; p
N
x (l))
@pNx (l)
i.e. the alternative prot function leads to the same equilibrium prices as (34)
and hence can be used to derive equilibrium locations in stage I.
Total prots in stage I given the equilibrium price vector pN(l)0 with generic
element pNx and p
A
x from stage II can then be written as
Ix(p
A
x ; p
N
x (l)) =
0B@(pNx (l)  cNx + (1  ) 2 1() 1 (cAx )1  1| {z }
c0x
1CAmsNx (pN(l))
(38)
so that stage I equilibrium prots are linear in the market shares that are given
by the Hotelling specication, i.e. for interior rms see (4).
Clearly this equilibrium rm prot is decreasing in costs cNx and c
A
x and
increasing in : The comparative statics of prot with regard  is negative if
 >> cAx :We refer to the term in brackets c
0
x as extended costin what follows.
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4 Data
The dataset on the readersside contains market level data on circulation, cover
prices, and content characteristics of the four daily quality national newspapers
in the UK (Guardian, The Times, Independent, and Daily Telegraph), with
monthly observations from 1990 to 2000. Data on circulation come from the
Audit Bureau of Circulation (ABC). Data on prices were collected from news-
paper publishers themselves.
Data on the results of the political elections and on the political position
of the newspapers were collected from the British Election Surveys (BES) of
1992 and 1997 and from the British Panel Election Survey (BPES) for the years
1992-1997 and 1997-2001. In particular, the relative political position of the
newspaper was calculated as the percentage of readers of a given newspaper
who a) voted for the conservative (or alternatively the labour) party b) felt
closer to the conservative (or alternatively to the labour) party c) thought their
newspaper favoured the conservative (or alternatively the labour) party.
On the advertising side of the market we acquired market level data on
advertising quantity and revenues of the same newspapers with monthly obser-
vations from 1991 to 2000 from Nielsen Media Research UK. The latter directly
collects data on quantities and applies list prices in order to calculate advertising
revenues. In doing so, however, Nielsen also applies an estimate of the discounts
with respect to the list prices. We recovered nominal advertising tari¤s dividing
revenues by quantity. Finally, we deated cover prices and advertising tari¤s by
the Consumer Price Index.
The data is depicted in Figure 1 above (cover prices) and on the following
Figure 2 (circulation), Figure 3 (advertising volume), Figure 4 (advertising tar-
i¤s), Figure 5 (circulation and advertising volume for the whole market) and
Figure 6 (political position).
5 Empirical analysis
We proceed to analyse how the price war discussed above a¤ected the two-sides
of the newspaper market. The analysis at this stage is only descriptive. We plan
to run a full econometric analysis soon, once we have identied and collected
suitable instruments for cover prices on the readersand both advertising tari¤s
and circulation on the advertisersside of the market. Suitable instruments could
include other exogenous or pre-determined characteristics of the newspapers on
the readers side (such as featured content sections) and on the advertisers
side (such as demographics of the readers) or measures of the marginal costs
(identied as the cost of the paper, the ink, and the distribution).
15
For The Times Figure 2c reveals that, as The Times cut its price for the
rst time in September 1993, circulation of The Times immediately picked up.
It increased even more as The Times cut its price again in June 1994. However
it didnt drop when the price was raised again rst in July 1995, then in No-
vember 1995 and nally in November 1999. Rather it rst picked up again in
1997 and then stabilised at a much higher level than before the price war. Fig-
ure 3c shows that advertising quantity always increased, while Figure 4c shows
that advertising tari¤s rst declined up to December 1994 and then increased.
According to Figures 6i-ii The Times moved substantially to the political Left.
In particular, Figure 6i depicts the change in the percentage of readers of The
Times who voted conservative for both the 1992 and the 1997 elections: How-
ever, as the labour party won the elections in 1997, one would expect a fall in
the percentage of readers voting Conservatives in all newspapers. To cotronl for
that, Figure 6ii graphs the percentage increase in the percentage of readers of
The Times who voted Conservative with respect to the percentage of readers in
the market who voted Conservatives.
For the Independent Figure 2b shows that the initial decision of the Inde-
pendent in October 1993 to react to The Times by raising its price lead to the
loss of even more circulation. As circulation continued to drop it was forced to
lower its price in August 1994. But circulation dropped further until January
1996. In the meantime the Independent raised its price again in July 1995. It
then stabilised despite the price being rst raised in January 1996 and again in
October 1997 and cut again later on. Figure 3b shows that advertising quantity
has increased from August 1994, while according to Figure 4b advertising tari¤s
dropped sharply during 1995 and started to increase again only in 1997. Figure
6 shows that the Independent moved a bit to the political Left.
For the Daily Telegraph Figure 2d shows that circulation dropped up to May
1994 then increased and dropped again as of October 1994 to February 1996
and peaked again in January 1997. According to Figure 3d advertising quantity
increased from August 1994 while advertising tari¤s always increased as shown
in Figure 4d. According to Figure 6 the Daily Telegraph might have even moved
to the political Right.
For the Guardian Figure 1a shows that it never changed its nominal price,
i.e. it never took part in the cover price war. According to Figure 4a however,
it did lower its nominal advertising price during the price war and then raised
it substantially from November 1996 after the price war had ended. As shown
in Figure 2b circulation of the Guardian initially dropped a little but then
stabilised. According to Figure 3b advertising volumes always increased. Figure
6 shows that also the Guardian moved to the political Left.
For the total quality newspaper market Figures 5-i and 5-ii show that before
the price war circulation was decreasing, it increased during the price war and
16
up to 1998, then dropped and stabilised in the last two years. Advertising
volume instead always increased in the period under consideration.
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Overall, comparing 1992-1993 (before the beginning of the price war) and
1996-1997 (after the end of the price war), we nd that:
- Cover prices were much lower for The Times, slightly lower for the Inde-
pendent and the Daily Telegraph, unchanged for the Guardian.
- Circulation of quality newspapers was in general much higher; in partic-
ular it was slightly lower for the Guardian, much lower for The Independent,
much higher for The Times and higher, though later again lower, for the Daily
Telegraph.
- Advertising volume on quality newspapers was much higher for each of the
four newspapers.
- Advertising tari¤s were unchanged for the Guardian (though later increas-
ing), lower for the Independent (though later increasing but not back to the
level before the price war), much higher for The Times (and increasing further
afterwards); much higher (and always increasing) for the Daily Telegraph.
Finally, looking at the data on political position, we nd that:
- All newspapers but possibly the Daily Telegraph moved to the political
Left.
- The move to the political Left of The Times was substantial and started
during the price war, well before the public endorsement of Tony Blair by Rupert
Murdoch on the occasion of the UK general elections of 1997.
- The Daily Telegraph may even have moved slightly to the political Right.
6 Simulation
Given the model outlined above, we can simulate changes of the exogenous
variables and analyse whether they might have been the ones giving rise to the
observed changes between the period before and the one after the price war.
In particular proposition 3 implies that our two-sided market setup can be
reduced to a Hotelling problem with four rms, simultaneous choices of location
and prices and advertising rates. A similar problem has been analysed in a Götz,
(2005) who extends work of Neven (1987) and Economides (1993) in a standard
market. We are thus able to employ a modied Mathematica algorithm to solve
for the equilibrium of the rst stage locations explicitly.
The algorithm is based on a Newton-Raphson approximation of the equi-
librium rst stage location with starting values l0=(0;:3; :6; 1)0: The algorithm
proceeds by evaluating the tangent on the original function at the starting value,
nds its intercept with the abscissa which is then used to nd the functional
value and tangent again recursively until the point of tangency and the intercept
with the abscissa coincide. The algorithm converges and su¢ ciency of the rst
order necessary conditions for optimality can be checked by looking at the prot
function for local deviations.
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Because of the economies of scale and scope which typically characterize the
media market, a possible e¤ect of Rupert Murdochs acquisition of the Times
could have been a cost advantage over the rivals. In particular this could have
been due to the setting up of the new production plant in Wapping, To explore
the e¤ect of such a change in productive e¢ ciency we therefore assume that
starting from a symmetric situation the marginal cost of production of the
newspaper Times cNx drops substantially (reducing the extended cost c
0
x) and
we investigate the e¤ect this change has on the equilibrium magnitudes of the
model.
6.1 The symmetric situation
We assume that t= = 10 and that the extended cost is c
0
x = :5 for all rms.
The NR-algorithm then yields equilibrium location on the political line in the
rst stage of the game as
l = (lG; l

I ; l

T ; l

DT )
0 = (:124; :396; :604; :876)0 (39)
Note that despite the symmetry of the situation there remains a di¤erence be-
tween the interior and the non-interior newspapers. This implies that only the
locations of interior newspapers I and T and those of the non-interior newspa-
pers G and DT are mirror images, i.e. lG = 1   lDT and lI = 1   lT . These
equilibrium locations imply equilibrium prices in the second stage as
pN(l) = (pG(l
); pI(l
); pT (l
); pDT (l
))0 = (1:566; 1:216; 1:216; 1:566)0 (40)
where again we observe the symmetry between interior and non-interior rms.
The equilibrium market share vector of the readers market is
msNx (p
N(l)) = (:196; :304; :304; :196)0 (41)
which corresponds to the market share vector of the advertising market by (28).
Equilibrium prots are
Ix(p
A
x ; p
N
x (l
)) = (:209; :218; :218; :209)0 (42)
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6.2 An asymmetric cost situation
We now assume that the extended cost of The Times T drops to c
0
x = :2: This
may be due to a substantial printing cost advantage resulting from substan-
tially more e¢ cient production methods at Wapping or due to some exogenous
increase of the demand for advertising for T only (both are consistent with the
Times joining a media conglomerate such as Rupert Murdochs). Given this
exogenous cost shock, the equilibrium magnitudes change to
l = (lG; l

I ; l

T ; l

DT )
0 = (:103; :353; :577; :887)0 (43)
Thus the equilibrium location on the political line of all newspapers but the DT
shift to the Left. This nding is akin to the results in the non-strategic rm
setting of Behringer (2007) based on market data only. The implied equilibrium
prices in the second stage are
pN(l) = (pG(l
); pI(l
); pT (l
); pDT (l
))0 = (1:4; 1:158; 1:128; 1:647)0 (44)
so that all equilibrium prices but that of the DT go down. The equilibrium
market share vector of the readers market is now
msNx (p
N(l)) = (:18; :279; :357; :185)0 (45)
so that market shares of all newspapers but that of the T go down.
Finally equilibrium prots are now
Ix(p
A
x ; p
N
x (l
)) = (:162; :183; :331; :212)0 (46)
so that equilibrium prots of the G and the I go down but that of the T and
the DT go up. Thus by moving further to the political Right, the DT is able to
reduce the competitive pressure (and even increase is prot despite its decreasing
market share) that results from the Ts unilaterally lower extended costs. The
I on the other hand, being an interior rm does not have this option as a move
to the political Left will automatically increase the competitive pressure from
the G. Hence this move is punished with a substantially lower prot, but also
the prot of the G su¤ers.
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7 Conclusion
We proposed a theoretical model encompassing demand for di¤erentiated prod-
ucts on both sides of the market and prot maximization by competing oligopolis-
tic publishers who recognise the existence of indirect network e¤ects between
the two sides of the market as they choose rst the political position, then
simultaneously the cover prices and the advertising price
We then discussed the price war among UK quality newspapers in the 90s in
light of the model above. The observed changes in market structure in the UK
newspaper industry in the 90s are clearly remarkable. However there appear to
be many candidate explanations for these changes,which are not even necessarily
exclusive.
In particular in the above simulation we have shown that asymmetric produc-
tion costs may explain much of the observed changes in prices, circulation and
advertising volumes. In future work we should be able to replace the parametric
assumptions of this simulation with econometric estimations. However even at
this stage with exogenous parametric assumption the complexity of the changes
in market structure given the realistic Hotelling di¤erentiation with interior and
non-interior rms on the political line becomes evident.
An alternative explanation of the observed market changes is the breakdown
of a collusive agreement on cover prices which was upset when Rupert Murdoch
took over the Times and changed old habits. In this context further econometric
investigation along the lines of Argentesi & Filistrucchi (2007) allowing for a
Hotelling demand structure would be indicated.
As emphasized in Behringer (2007) the possibility of predatory behaviour
not (only) in prices but also by means of movements on the political line is also
feasible. Hence there may be alternative reasons for such location changes as
the ones shown above that are not captured in short run prot maximization
motives and such changes may deserve the label predatory. However, given the
lack of reliable cost data any nal conclusion seems premature at this stage.
An eventual alternative and one that also takes seriously the role of product
placement on the political line is that the observed changes in market structure
result from a (expected) positive shock on the demand side for advertising. This
shock would lead to an adjustment process that nally implies lower equilibrium
prices on the readers side as the new optimal mix of newspaper nance has more
of its revenue resulting from advertisers than from readers. It is conceivable that
Rupert Murdoch, being rst to spot this change in the market structure was
also rst to react. Generically a new price equilibrium implies that also the
optimal locations of the papers on the political line will now di¤er but changes
are likely to be more symmetric. Further research will identify econometrically
which of the explanations above is most consistent with the observed data.
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9 Appendix A - Figures
-.5
5
1.
45
re
ap
ri_
gu
ar
di
an
1990m1 1992m1 1994m1 1996m1 1998m1 2000m1
months
Figure 1a- Nominal Cover Prices of the Guardian
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Figure 1b - Nominal Cover Prices of the Independent
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Figure1c- Nominal Cover Prices of the Times
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Figure 1d - Nominal Cover Prices of the Daily Telegraph
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Figure 2a - Circulation of the Guardian
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Figure 2b - Circulation of the Independent
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Figure 2c - Circulation of The Times
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Figure 2d - Circulation of the Daily Telegraph
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Figure 3a - Advertising Volume on the Guardian
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Figure 3c - Advertising Volume on The Times
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Figure 3d - Advertising Volume on the Daily Telegraph
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Figure 4a - Advertising Tari¤s for the Guardian
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Figure 4b - Nominal Advertising Tari¤s for the Independent
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Figure 4c-Nominal Advertising Tari¤s for the Times
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Figure 4d- Nominal Advertsing Tari¤s for the Daily Telegraph
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Figure 5 i- Circulation of all four quality newspapers
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Figure 6i - Political position (percent readers voting Conservatives- absolute)
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Figure 6ii - Political Position (percent readers voting Conservative - relative)
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